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Author: Kevin Badgley

What is in a Name? Private Equity Industry Considers Label Change

Posted on April 11, 2013September 24, 2013 by Kevin Badgley

Entering 2012, expectations were high for the private equity industry. Firms were finally recovering from the 2008 financial meltdown and private equity executives were confident that transactions would only continue to increase.[1] To top it off, one of the field’s very own had a legitimate chance to become our nation’s next president. Despite this favorable outlook, 2012 resulted in such damage to private equity’s image that some are now insisting the industry needs a complete rebranding.[2]

While the private equity industry has shouldered the blame for economic problems in the past, public criticism rose to unprecedented levels in the past year. The most widespread vilification occurred during the presidential election, when both Democrat and Republican rivals of candidate Mitt Romney spent millions attacking his private equity background.[3] Around the same time, a federal class action was filed accusing some of the nation’s largest private equity firms of a wide conspiracy to rig deal prices.[4] Considering the very negative popular conception of private equity following these events, it was not surprising when the Security and Exchange Commission’s enforcement division continued the assault by announcing that a regulatory heavy-hand would soon be coming down on the industry.[5]

Historically, private equity firms have not found this type of publicity overly concerning. They have had little need or incentive to uphold their image because they have operated completely in the private sector.[6] However, with many of the big firms going public in recent years, high-level private equity executives now believe that the industry must be “widely trusted” and maintain a “pristine reputation.” [7]

Looking to save face, some private equity practitioners have proposed rethinking the name “private equity.”[8] Blackstone Group President Tony James dislikes the label’s clandestine connotation and feels that it “subliminally sends the wrong message.”[9] Others argue for change by citing the fact that the industry is no longer truly “private,” as it is now regulated by government agencies.[10]

The corporate world has seen this type of makeover before. In the 1980s, “corporate raiders” became symbols of Wall Street greed for their tendency to conduct hostile takeovers of large companies. When legal countermeasures were put into place to thwart these attacks, corporate raiders revised their approach and adopted a more politically correct name: “activist shareholders.”[11] Since the re-characterization, activist shareholders have enjoyed success despite continuing to shake up companies like the corporate raiders before them.[12]

But still, in order for a name change to work, the industry must settle on an appropriate moniker. Noting how Blackstone provides its limited partners with widespread access to its portfolio companies’ financials, James suggests that the name should be changed to “clarity equity.”[13] Other ideas such as “ long term capital providers” and “opportunity capital” suggest positivity and communicate an actual function of these firms.[14]

While altering a label has helped groups repair their image in the past, it is a difficult process that is by no means guaranteed to succeed. An effective approach would supplement the name change with an effort to better educate the public on the benefits of the industry. Regardless of what these investors call themselves, their increasingly important reputation is unlikely to improve significantly unless they first make some attempt to eliminate the negativity surrounding the term “private equity.”

____________________________________________________________
[1] Hillary Canada, Survey Says: Glass-Half-Full Outlook For 1H 2012, Wall Street Journal Private Equity Beat (May 1, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2012/05/01/survey-says-glass-half-full-outlook-for-1h-2012/.

[2] William Alden, Rethinking the Term ‘Private Equity’, New York Times Dealbook (Jan. 31, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/rethinking-the-term-private-equity/; Shasha Dai, Should Private Equity Industry Change Its Name?, Wall Street Journal Private Equity Beat (Feb. 1, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2013/02/01/should-private-equity-industry-change-its-name/.

[3] Tomio Geron, The Mitt Romney Effect on Private Equity and Venture Capital, Forbes (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/09/21/the-mitt-romney-effect-on-private-equity-and-venture-capital/.

[4] Don Jeffrey & Devin Banerjee, Blackstone, KKR, Bain, Accused of Agreeing Not to Compete, Bloomberg (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-10/investors-claim-kkr-told-equity-firms-not-to-bid-for-hca.html.

[5] See Bruce Karpati, Chief, SEC Enforcement Division’s Asset Management Unit, Private Equity Enforcement Concerns at Private Equity International Conference (Jan. 23, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013/spch012313bk.htm).

[6] D.M. Levine, Carlyle and Oaktree Are Latest Private Equity Firms Expected to Go Public, The Huffington Post (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/11/private-equity-firms-go-public_n_1417734.html public_n_1417734.html.

[7] Alden, supra note 2.

[8] Id.; Dai, supra note 2.

[9] Dai, supra note 2.

[10] See id.

[11] Bob Moon, Corporate Raiders Morph Into Nice(r) Guys, American Public Media Marketplace (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/corporate-raiders-morph-nicer-guys.

[12] See id.

[13] Dai, supra note 2.

[14] See id.

Private Equity Firms Accused of Misleading Buyer

Posted on March 16, 2013July 29, 2013 by Kevin Badgley

Japanese beer and beverage maker Asahi Group has filed a lawsuit in Australia against two private equity firms who sold Asahi a liquor company for $1.3 billion USD. The suit claims that Australian-based Pacific Equity Partners and Hong Kong-based Unitas Capital—the previous owners of New Zealand’s Independent Liquor—presented inflated earnings figures during the sales process.[1] As a result of this “misleading and deceptive conduct,” Asahi feels that it grossly overpaid for the premixed cocktail distributor and that it deserves compensation.[2]

At the heart of Asahi’s complaint is the allegation that Independent Liquor’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) figures were embellished.[3] EBITDA is often used to value a company for purposes of buying it, and has been called the “single most important financial contributor to buyout performance.”[4] The complaint alleges that Independent used creative accounting techniques such as ‘channel stuffing’—“a practice where a supplier forward sells stock on extended terms to retailers in order to account for significant ‘one off’ sales in a particular period”—to wrongfully include income and exclude expenses.[5] Asahi claims that these practices inflated Independent’s EBITDA by $NZ42 million,[6] and made it appear as if Independent was growing at the time of the sale when normalized calculations show that it was actually declining.[7] These inconsistencies likely had a significant impact on the negotiated purchase price, as Asahi claims it “conducted due diligence thoroughly and in good faith and relied on [the EBITDA figures] provided.”[8]

Although this dispute will be resolved in an Australian court, it is factually similar to a case arising out of Delaware a few years ago. In ABRY Partners v. Providence Equity,[9] the buyer, ABRY Partners, accused the private equity seller, Providence Equity Partners, of knowingly presenting a portfolio company’s misstated financials in connection with a sale.[10] The purchase agreement contained provisions designed to insulate Providence from liability for representations made by its portfolio company.[11] Specifically, the warranty that ABRY claimed was breached was “by its plain terms . . . [a warranty] made only by the [portfolio company] and not by [Providence].”[12] The agreement also contained a $20 million indemnification cap.[13] The Delaware Court of Chancery ultimately found that the indemnification cap would be honored if Providence did not lie.[14] However, it found that ABRY could collect damages in excess of the cap if it could prove that Providence knew its portfolio company made false representations or if Providence itself made such representations.[15]

If the Australian court takes a similar approach, the purchase agreement will be crucial in determining the level of culpability Asahi must prove and the amount of damages that they can recover. ABRY suggests that a properly drafted agreement can insulate PE firms from fraud committed by their portfolio companies in connection with the sale as long as the firm was not aware of it. If such a term were contained in this agreement, it would force Asahi to prove that these companies knew Independent was manipulating the EBITDA figures. While this is a seemingly heavy burden, the Asahi complaint suggests that they would be able to prove knowledge through email correspondence they have obtained.

Regardless of the outcome, this case evidences the importance of (1) conducting thorough due diligence; (2) understanding ways in which EBITDA can be manipulated; and (3) thinking carefully about future liability when drafting purchase agreements.

_________________________________________________________________

[1] Neil Gough, Asahi Sues 2 Private Equity Firms Over $1.3 Billion Deal, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:13 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/asahi-sues-2-private-equity-firms-over-1-3-billion-deal/.

[2] Id.

[3] Asahi Alleges ‘Channel Stuffing’ At Beer Firm, The New Zealand Herald (Feb. 18, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10866101.

[4] Nicolaus Loos, Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts 229 (2006).

[5] Adele Ferguson, Japanese Brewer Up in Arms Over Purchase Price, Newcastle Herald (Feb. 26, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.theherald.com.au/story/1326151/japanese-brewer-up-in-arms-over-purchase-price/?cs=9.

[6] See id.

[7] Asahi Alleges ‘Channel Stuffing’ At Beer Firm, supra note 3.

[8] Gough, supra note 1.

[9] ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006).

[10] See Ruling in ABRY Partners v. Providence Equity Case Has Lessons for Buyers and Sellers, Goodwin Proctor LLP (Mar. 14, 2006), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Newsletters/Private%20Equity%20Update/2006/Ruling_in_ABRY_Partners_v_Providence_Equity_Case_Has_Lessons_for_Buyers_and_Sellers.pdf.

[11] See id.

[12] ABRY Partners, 891 A.2d at 1042.

[13] See Ruling in ABRY Partners v. Providence Equity Case Has Lessons for Buyers and Sellers, supra note 10.

[14] See id.

[15] See id.

The National Hockey League and Private Equity

Posted on October 6, 2012July 29, 2013 by Kevin Badgley

For the second time in seven years, there is a real possibility that an ongoing labor dispute will prevent the puck from ever being dropped on the National Hockey League season. Hockey has become an afterthought, a professional sport that is lucky to receive a minute of airtime on the nightly Sportscenter broadcast. While reports have estimated that the NHL has lost as much as $240 million in the last two seasons,1 diehard hockey fans do still exist. And while they would probably rather spend their time smuggling octopi into Joe Louis Arena, they may find hope in reading a recently published piece by Bloomberg Businessweek that asks, “Could Private Equity Solve Pro Hockey’s Problems?”

The article lays out a number of qualities that would make the NHL attractive to private equity firms. Among the qualities listed are:

• “Weak management
• Underachieving revenue
• Opportunities to expand while taking on debt
• Problems that are driving down value, but could be solved by a fresh set of outside managers.”2

These undesirable characteristics have plagued the NHL for years, and PE firms have taken notice. In 2005, Bain Capital surprised many with an offer to buy the entire league for $3.5 billion.3 Bain’s proposal reflected the classic PE business-model: by combining all 30 teams into a single business entity, it would be possible to streamline operations, boost TV revenue, and slash player salary from a position of absolute leverage.4 This single ownership strategy is the model that Major League Soccer, a league that started as an afterthought in the crowded American sports market, has employed (to at least limited success).5

As a dispassionate third party, Bain would focus solely on making money—it would not be blindsided by the emotions that undoubtedly come with owning a pro sports team. Yet those emotions are what ultimately doomed the deal, as Bain failed to muster the required majority approval from team owners.6 Given that most of these owners are independently wealthy and are not in the business for the money, it is unlikely that this type of transaction would ever be agreed upon.

Even if a firm like Bain were somehow able to overcome this hurdle, they would still be faced with an even larger issue: the players themselves. During a PE takeover, labor is often one of the first areas in which costs are cut. Technological improvements or cheaper workers typically replace longtime employees. However, sports are unique in that the laborers are the products. The NHL could recruit inexpensive, second-rate talent, but it certainly would not improve economic conditions considering that the league currently employs the top players in the world and still struggles to make a profit. The alternative—convincing the current players to take a significant pay cut—is extremely unrealistic given the lucrative contracts that foreign franchises would assuredly offer the NHL’s stars.

At first glance, the NHL and PE may seem like a perfect match. However, a closer look reveals that some major issues would have to be resolved in order for the relationship to be profitable. But still, if an entire season is lost and teams continue to operate in the red, the league would be wise to at least reconsider a PE model that has helped save so many similarly distressed companies in the past.

_______________________________________
1 Dirk Hoag, NHL CBA 2012: How can the league, as a whole, be losing money?, ON THE FORECHECK (Sept. 4, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.ontheforecheck.com/2012/9/4/3292168/nhl-cba-2012-league-losing-money-ha-ha-ha.
2 Nick Summers, Could Private Equity Solve Pro Hockey’s Problems?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-11/could-private-equity-solve-pro-hockey-s-problems.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See http://majorleaguesoccertalk.com/2009/11/27/mls-and-its-players-third-party-ownership-player-and-club-rights-non-existent/; see also, Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (MLS central-ownership structure not an anti-trust violation).
6 Id.

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